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ABSTRACT 
 
This is a study of the evolution of strategies of large multinational (MNC) firms doing business in 
China.  Using the TOWS approach (Weirich, 1982) we classified the strategic posture of MNC 
subsidiaries in China into four discrete frames based on a survey of large firms.  The results of 
our study applying the TOWS approach have allowed us to expose the trend of strategic evolution.  
We find that the primary investment motivation of MNS in China has changed from “low labor 
cost” to “exploiting Chinese market”.  We report the motivations, actions, and aspirations of the 
managers of largest multinational subsidiaries operating there.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
hat are the dominant strategies employed by multinational corporations in establishing MNC 
subsidiaries in China?  What are the keys to success?  How have successful strategies evolved over 
time?  This paper presents the results of our in-depth survey and analysis of the entry and evolution 
of MNC subsidiaries’ strategies over a fifteen year period and reports the alternative pathways to success identified 
by a large sample of firms.  Over the last 20 years, interrelations between countries worldwide have escalated due in 
large part to rapid acceleration in the rate of foreign direct investments (FDI).  Traditionally, researchers contended 
that competitive advantage was developed at the level of the corporate headquarters and “leveraged overseas 
through the transfer of technology to a network of foreign subsidiaries” (Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998: 773).  Other 
scholars, like Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989), developed models focused on the role multinational subsidiaries have 
played to the development and evolution of competitive advantage.  Today scholars realize that subsidiaries are 
established for a variety of reasons— to exploit or to develop new markets, to develop greater efficiencies, or to 
access closer or less costly resources.  In the early 1990s, the former Soviet block countries, particularly the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, were the targets of much FDI largely because of the market opportunities (Steensma, 
Tihanyi, Lyles & Dhanaraj, 2005).  Today, however, the attention of the world has turned to China—a country rich 
in FDI and international trade. 
 
As of 2002, more than 400 of the 500 largest worldwide MNCs had already invested in China and most had 
at least one subsidiary in the country.  As we will see, this population represents a great deal of diversity and 
complexity.  Therefore, China provides an excellent context for understanding the strategies of MNCs and the 
development of their subsidiaries, especially in light of the direct effect on global venture capital. 
 
This research reports the results of a study of the global strategies and strategic evolution of MNC 
subsidiaries operating in China.  We examine their strategic roles in an attempt to identify the subsidiaries’ 
significance in the internal network system.  Our work is theoretically grounded primarily in two theories, the 
resource based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) and the organizational learning perspective (Huber, 1991).  In 
order to present our results we have adopted the TOWS matrix classification scheme invented by Weihrich (1982) 
and have recaptured some of the robustness he envisioned for the technique.  Our results suggest that, in general, the 
subsidiary companies we studied assume a passive arrangement with the host country during the early years of 
development.  However, this posture rapidly evolves to a more active arrangement as the subsidiary grows and 
develops. 
W 
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The strategic motives that inspire MNCs to engage in FDI have been a source of discussion for many years 
among researchers.  It has been argued that FDI can “give individual firms a competitive advantage, improve their 
financial position, increase capacity utilization, and raise technological standards” (Zitta & Powers, 2003: 275).  As 
is common in previous research, we rely on the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) and the organizational 
learning perspective (OLP) (Huber, 1991, Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles & Dhanaraj, 2005; Das & Teng, 2000) to 
understand the initial motives, as well as the growth and development strategies of MNC in China.  RBV argues that 
sustainable competitive advantage is the output of the rarity, inimitability, and non-tradability of intangible 
resources (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991).  According to Zitta and Powers (2003) firms’ primary motivation for 
investing in foreign markets are either factor-seeking or market-seeking reasons.  Typically, firms following factor-
seeking motivations are looking for resources that can aid in their operations in a foreign country.  Such resources 
can include land, as well as labor resources, or the availability of capital goods (Dunning, 1993, 1998).  Companies 
that are investing for market-seeking purposes are looking for new markets for their products rather than resources 
to aid in production (Zitta & Powers, 2003).  The resource based view argues that whatever the motive for the 
investment, successful firm performance is dependent on management’s ability to deploy the necessary resources 
(physical, labor or market) (Barney, 1991). 
 
Complementary to resource based view, the organizational learning perspective focuses on the importance 
of knowledge acquisition (i.e. drawing on available knowledge, learning from experience, learning by observing 
other organizations, grafting on to itself components that possess knowledge needed but not possessed by the 
organization, and noticing or searching for information about the organization's environment and performance) 
(Huber, 1991) leading to the creation of knowledge-based and firm-based capabilities (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).  
In today’s global and highly competitive environment, long term viability and sustainability of a firm requires a 
combination of both specialized resources and knowledge-based resources.  According to Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles 
and Dhanaraj (2005: 214), “it is the knowledge-based capabilities that provide the flexibility to realign resources as 
markets change.”  Thus, OLP supports Dunning’s (1993) theory on market seekers.  For example, a market presence 
might be required in order to adapt a firm’s product to specific market requirements.  Thus, in the case of operating 
subsidiaries, the process is more complex than previously believed.  The parent company can provide the decision 
influences (or knowledge resources) that affect the initial deployment of physical resources (in accordance with the 
resource based perspective).  Together with these resources, learning shapes the firms outcomes and competitive 
posture (Das & Teng, 1998). 
 
Examining the nature of the initial investment decision from a different perspective, Zitta and Powers 
(2003: 276) suggest that “possible motivations behind factor- seeking and market-seeking behavior can be 
categorized in two dimensions—external market factors and internal company reasons.”  External market 
motivations include those elements in the foreign market that make that market attractive to a MNC.  One such 
factor revolves around common human resource practices in the host country.  The sub-constructs of this factor 
include such things as labor costs, the degree of unionization, safety and labor policies, and the skill level of 
workforce (Miller, 1993).  Interestingly, strict labor policies in the home country can likewise serve as a motivator to 
seek FDI opportunities (Hartman, 1984).  On the other hand, availability of labor, skill level of labor and the cost of 
labor may serve as a strong motivator for foreign investment (Zhang, 2001). 
 
One of the most significant factors to market-seeking FDI is size and growth of the host market.  
Specifically, the developmental stage of the country, projected growth rates and existence of competition in the 
subject industry are of interest to an MNC.  Those companies with extensive international experience often find the 
less attractive, more uncertain markets of interest to them (Dunning, 1973).  Henley, Kirkpatrick and Wilde (1999) 
and Zhang (2001) pointed to market size as a primary factor for entry into China, which has had unprecedented 
success in attracting FDI.  Likewise, Cheng and Kwan (2000) noted that the vastness of the Chinese market, as well 
as the rapidly improving infrastructure, made investment attractive. 
 
The political climate in a host country can often make or break FDI decisions. In particular, capital 
controls, as well as restrictions on the transfer of international funds are among the policies that could cause firms to 
think twice before investing in a particular country.  And, as noted by Zitta and Powers (2003: 277), “when these 
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polices lead to prolonged deviation from purchasing power parity so that the real exchange rates change, FDI flows 
may be altered.”  Other issues of concern with regard to FDI decisions are antitrust policies, government transfer 
pricing policies, and intellectual property laws (Brewer, 1993).  In addition, other host country laws or customer 
requirements could force an MNC to undertake activities in that country that the firm would prefer to do elsewhere 
(Birkinshaw & Hood, 1998).  Much of the extant literature bundles many of these issues together under the term 
“institutions,” which is a measure of a country’s political, legal and economic perspectives and practices, which 
makes comparability across countries problematic (Wei, 2000). 
 
Finally, the impact of interest rates, exchange rate fluctuations and the availability of financing sources in 
the international capital markets can influence FDI decisions.  For example, countries whose currency has recently 
been devalued provide a generally positive incentive for FDI in the short term (Froot & Stein, 1989; Zitta & Powers, 
2003).  Based on their observation of US FDI, Froot and Stein (1991) found empirical support that FDI increased 
with currency depreciation.  These findings have been consistently supported with regard to short-run movements in 
exchange rates (Grubert & Mitti, 1991; Swenson, 1994; Kogurt & Chang, 1996).  By illustration, empirical evidence 
has shown that China's exchange rate policy played a critical role in its FDI boom from 1981 to 2002, as did the 
devaluation of the yuan (Xing, 2005). 
 
As previously noted, the motivation for establishing a MNC may be internal to the company.  For example, 
when the home country’s market is saturated, many firms might look to the international market as a place for 
growth and as a means of risk reduction.  Likewise, when products require considerable adaptation when marketed 
in another country, firms often find it favorable to be close to the foreign market and are more apt to invest in 
foreign operations (Root, 1990). 
 
Today, in particular, there appears to be a stronger desire for firms to have a global orientation, and such 
growth by international expansion is an “important strategic option for both small and large firms (Lu & Beamish, 
2001: 565).  Stavrevski (2007) noted that such outward investments help to improve access to markets which, in 
turn, provides the benefits of competitive advantage.  Succinctly put by Tang and Yu (1990: 476) “world markets 
provide opportunities for firms to exploit their comparative advantages through international horizontal integration 
strategies.” 
 
Profit has been long considered a motivation for FDI.  An early study by Cohen and Rugman (1976) found 
that by increasing the number of countries a firm operated in and/or increasing the ratio of foreign activities to total 
activities, US corporations increased profitability.  The authors also found that the stability of input costs due to 
international expansion increased the overall value of the firm through increased market valuation.  Tang and Yu 
(1990) examined the profit impact to host firms of different production-related strategies employed when entering a 
foreign market.  Their results suggested that FDI generates the highest profit and is the dominate entry strategy for 
companies as long as they can charge an optimal licensing fee.  In a 2007 speech at the11th China International Fair 
for Investment and Trade (CIFIT) Zoran Stavrevski, Deputy Prime Minister of Macedonia (CIFIT, 2007), stated that 
while other factors come into play in the FDI decision, profit was clearly the primary motivating factor. 
 
The need for technology and innovation are huge motivating factors for FDI.  Countries with a high 
innovation capacity (the ability to produce and commercialize a flow of innovative technology on a long term basis), 
serve as a drawing cards for FDI (Furman, Porter & Stern, 2002).  Research spanning three decades has found strong 
evidence of FDI in countries with highly advanced processes and/or products (Caves, 1971; Orr, 1973; Buckley & 
Casson, 1976; Arpan & Ricks, 1986).  In essence, this need for technology and innovation can be viewed as a 
“knowledge-seeking” motivation for FDI. 
 
While many motives exist for a firm to establish subsidiaries, the growth and development of that 
subsidiary is greatly impacted by the level of development in the host country (Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles & 
Dhanaraj, 2005).  Svetlicic and Rojec (1994) suggested that transitioning economies often were characterized by a 
resource gap since some of the basic building blocks (markets, managerial skills, infrastructure, regulatory 
environment, etc.) were not yet fully developed.  However, this is not the case in the rapidly industrializing regions 
of China.  Consequently, the steady development of China's economy and the increasing purchasing power of its 
consumers make it extremely attractive to MNCs (Makinoa, S., et al., 2004) as well as a fertile research base for this 
study. 
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Although from its introduction, the TOWS matrix has been intended as a dynamic classification tool in 
complex business situations (Weihrich, 1982, pg. 71) its application in the management literature until recently has 
been limited.  Its author consulted to a manufacturer of products from aircraft, to automobiles to recreational 
vehicles and advocated its application to firms in multiple industries, across national borders and for multiple time 
periods, most notably including the future.  The technique has again been taken up and has recently been used as a 
part of fuzzy SWOT Analysis (Ghazinoory & Memariani, 2007), to find outlets for teaching home economics 
(Horne, & Kerr, 2003), for improving innovation strategies for credit departments (Chun-Chu, L, 2007), for 
developing strategies for a single Croatian insurance company (Božac & Tipurić, 2008) and for improving the 
national competitiveness of southeastern European countries (Kersan-Škabić & Tijanić, 2009).  We employ the 
concepts imbedded in the technique here for the purpose of classifying the multinational subsidiaries we have 
studied. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The targeted companies for this study are multinational subsidiaries (MNS) with operations in China.  
Since we wanted to examine subsidiaries with a significant presence in the country we narrowed our target 
population to subsidiaries where the parent corporation maintained 50% or more ownership or those where the 
parent company had a dominant plurality of shares if ownership was less than 50%.  A total of 400 survey 
questionnaires were mailed to top management officials of subsidiaries in more than 30 Chinese cities, including 
Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjing, Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Suzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shenyang, Zhangchun, to name a few.  
If the subsidiary was the result of a joint venture, we surveyed executives from the foreign holding firm as well as 
the Chinese partner to cross-validate the information we gathered.  Follow up telephone calls and e-mails were 
employed to encourage participation and to clarify and enrich responses where necessary. 
 
A total of one hundred-fifty questionnaires were returned for a response rate of thirty-seven point five 
percent.  Of those returned, twenty-two questionnaires were incomplete and therefore unusable, resulting in a 
sample of 128 firms for the first phase of our study.  Of these MNS, twenty-eight (21.9%) were US subsidiaries, 
twenty-two (17.2%) were Japanese, twenty-five (19.5%) were from countries in the European Union, forty-three 
(33.6%) were South Korean; and the remaining eight (7.8%) firms were from other countries (see Figure 1 below).  
A total of one hundred forty-five questionnaires were useable for second phase of our work.  The second phase of 
our study began by classifying the responses of each firm as to the dominant strategic approach reflected by the 
responses to our questions.  The respondents were asked to rank their own strategic priorities from among a set of 
priorities we suggested for three discrete periods of time.  The first period (what we will call “on entry”) was at the 
time of the firm entered the market.  This was true whether the firm was new to the country, the creation of a new 
entity or whether it was the result of a new joint venture or the result of new investment in an existing entity.  The 
second time period reflected in our findings is the present time.  Again, respondents were asked to rank their own 
strategic priorities from among a set of priorities we suggested to them.  Finally, respondents were asked to rank 
their own strategic priorities for the future from among a set of priorities we suggested to them.  The term “the 
future” was defined as having a time horizon of three to five years.  The responses were arrayed within each time 
period according to rank.  Then, the proportion of respondents assigning the same rank to the strategic priority was 
calculated.  The results are presented below (Tables 3 – 6) along with our descriptions of the trends we observed and 
clarifications made possible by follow-up communications with respondents. 
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Table 1 Respondent Statistics 
Characteristics Firm Classification n Percentage（%） 
Country Origin South Korea 
USA 
European Union 
Japan 
Others 
Singapore 
Thailand 
Australia 
Canada 
Malaysia 
Swiss 
43 
28 
25 
22 
10 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
33.6 
21.9 
19.5 
17.2 
7.8 
3.1 
1.6 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
Firm Nature Foreign Owned 
Foreign Holding 
Joint Venture 
91 
34 
3 
71.1 
26.6 
2.3 
Headquarters Location China Headquarters 
Global Headquarters 
Asia Pacific Headquarters 
Big China Headquarters 
Missing Data 
Others 
33 
31 
27 
7 
17 
13 
25.8 
24.2 
21.1 
5.5 
13.3 
10.2 
Industry Electronics 
Textile 
Chemistry and Pharmaceutical 
Iron, Steel, Mechanics and Engineering 
Auto Manufacturing 
Food and Beverages 
Commerce and Trade 
Transportation 
Tele-Communications 
Finance and Insurance 
Consulting 
Others 
Gasoline and Mining 
Real Estate 
Mass Communication 
35 
23 
15 
13 
9 
9 
7 
5 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
27.3 
18.0 
11.7 
10.2 
7.0 
7.0 
5.5 
3.9 
2.3 
1.6 
1.6 
1.6 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
Respondent Role Board Chairman 
Board Vice Chairman 
Board Members 
CEO 
Vice CEO 
Department Manager 
Others 
Missing Data 
3 
4 
6 
13 
16 
46 
31 
9 
2.3 
3.1 
4.7 
10.2 
12.5 
35.9 
24.2 
7.0 
Firm Age Less than 5 years 
5-9 years 
10-15 years 
More than 15years 
Missing data 
43 
49 
22 
10 
4 
33.6 
38.3 
17.2 
7.8 
3.1 
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Figure 1 Sample Ownership 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Cheap natural resources and an available, low cost labor force was the reason ninety-five percent of 
respondents selected market exploration and production as the primary role of the subsidiary.  In fact, nearly all the 
production-base subsidiaries ninety-seven point eight percent mentioned cheap labor as a motivating factor 
suggesting that much of China’s FDI followed external market/factor-seeking motivation. 
 
One internal market motivator which as been suggested to be the primary reason for FDI, profit 
maximization, was not acknowledged as a reason for initial entry into the Chinese market place.  The ability of an 
MNC to maximize profit has long been considered an important reason international expansion (Cohen & Rugman, 
1976).  The profit oriented subsidiaries gain profit by exploring price differences and transferring management 
skills. Hence, these subsidiaries operating in the host country do not intend to gain market share in the host country 
but anticipate averting the risks incurred in internationalization.  For this strategy to be successful the host country 
must be able to provide local advantages for capital management, including tax advantages as compared to the home 
country and less strict fund exchange control.  However, Chinese foreign exchange policies are not generally 
considered to be an advantage to subsidiaries (Southwest Economy, 2005).  According to our survey MNS 
frequently establish “no profit-center” subsidiaries in China specifically to avoid dealing with exchange policies.  A 
similar situation appears to be occurring with in the case of natural resources.  Coal and petroleum, for example, are 
under strict government control in China (Lee & Liu, 1996) and other resources may not always meet quality 
standards.  Consequently, our results show that MNS prefer to purchase raw materials from other global sources. 
 
THE ROLE OF EVOLUTION OF MNC SUBSIDIARIES IN CHINA 
 
Once the initial role of subsidiaries is adopted, our research suggests that the role does not remain fixed 
over time. Generally speaking, all the following elements can cause the adjustment of initial role of the subsidiaries: 
the evolution of the global strategy at the level of the parent company; changes in the environment of the host 
country and, the development of new strategic targets at the level of the overseas subsidiaries themselves.  The first 
two elements cause the reactive adjustment of the role of subsidiaries akin to that suggested by Miles and Snow 
(1978). Development targets emerging from overseas subsidiaries lead to a more active adjustment resembling the 
prospector or analyzer firm suggested by Miles and Snow (1978). 
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Table 2 Investment Motives Reported 
Investment Motives for MNC’s Subsidiaries in China 
Frequency 
N = 145 
Percentage of 
Sample (%) 
Market capacity and Potential of China 96 66.07 
To Establish production base in China 80 55.36 
To exploit china’s Market 71 49.11 
To pursue profit 71 49.11 
Cheaper labor force 63 43.75 
Cheaper Natural Resources and Raw Materials 23 16.07 
Export to other countries from China 22 15.18 
Seeking Chinese Techniques or joint technology 13 8.93 
Competing with Rivals 13 8.93 
Following Original customers 12 8.04 
To reduce transportation costs 6 4.46 
To ensure the quality of products and services 6 4.46 
To avoid risks 5 3.57 
To carry out R & D 4 2.68 
To transfer out-of-date technologies 4 2.68 
To avoid tariff or trade barriers 3 1.78 
 
In order to analyze the evolution (Miles and Snow, 2009) of the strategic role of subsidiaries in MNCs over 
to time, subsidiaries whose roles have changed were analyzed first.  Among altogether 145 sample enterprises 
whose questionnaire responses we report in this second phase of our study, eleven have adjusted their strategic role.  
Each of the eleven are production-base subsidiaries (see Figure 2 below), which amounts to only seven point five 
nine percent (7.59%) of the sample.  These changes have not occurred in the case of subsidiaries of any other type.  
Each of the eleven firms identified themselves as having changed have evolved as market pioneers.  Once the parent 
company has determined the global strategic role of its subsidiaries, we find the definition is not easily changed by 
the MNS, moreover, the increasing stability and maturity of laws and policies in China is also one of the factors that 
make the strategic role of a subsidiary in China remain relatively stable.  Dynamism is the regulatory climate is 
related to roles changes among subsidiaries generally. Despite the fact that the proportion of subsidiaries that change 
roles is small, the change of the strategic roles of MNS in China is significant.  That is, the roles of some of the 
MNS in China that have changed have evolved from a production-base role to that of a market-pioneer 
(Kalyanaram, et. al., 1995). The main reason we have identified explaining this trend is the switch of the investment 
motivation of the MNC subsidiaries in China. 
 
 
 
 
 
76% 
19% 
3% 2% 
0% 
10% 
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Figure 2  Initial Posture of MNC 
Subsidiaries 
Notes:  M = Market Explorer; P = Production Based; R = Risk Avoider; 
K = Knowledge Absorber 
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Our research shows that the leading two motivations reported by our respondents have changed from 
“cheap natural resources and an available, low cost labor force” into “exploiting Chinese market” and “establishing 
a production base in China”.  Further, the attitude reflected with respect to the domestic raw materials is interesting 
as well.  The former ranking shows that the companies paying attention to the raw materials are 3.95, ranking the 
fifth in the foreign investment motivations.  But now there are only 16.4% of subsidiaries in China with primary 
focus on this factor.  As we can see, the first investment motivation of MNS subsidiaries in China has changed from 
“low labor cost” to “exploiting Chinese market”.  Fully 39.3% of production-base subsidiaries have changed into 
market-pioneers among the firms we studied. 
 
The roles adopted by subsidiaries other than “production-based” MNS have not changed.  The result of our 
research indicates “market-explorer” subsidiaries, whose investing motivations have changed, account for eight 
point two percent (8.2%) of the total.  Seventy – seven percent (77%) of the subsidiaries have existed more than six 
years.  The dominant motivation of these nine subsidiaries has changed from “exploiting Chinese market” to 
“seeking greater profit”. 
 
This indicates that the focus of the role of “market explorer” subsidiaries’ investment motivation 
sometimes changes after a period of long term of growth and development.  During initial entry phase, most “market 
explorer” subsidiaries retain market capacity and potential as the primary goals, focusing on enlarging their share of 
the Chinese market through long-term growth and development.  In this case, the parent company provides strategic 
resources for its overseas subsidiaries through its global network until the subsidiary enters its strategic expansion 
phase.  It appears that this period of preparation is pivotal in allowing subsidiaries to establish a firm foothold in 
terms of market knowledge and relationships and then to swiftly leverage them into strategic advantage in this 
phase.  During the expanding phrase, the “market explorer” subsidiaries focus on exploiting Chinese market, as the 
need for strategic resources from parent company is gradually reduced.  Much of the profit created by subsidiaries 
themselves is used for their own reinvestment purposes.  They continue to enlarge their market shares in China for 
as long as the market permits, establishing and strengthening their leading positions in the industry by production, 
market and technology innovation. 
 
During the mature phrase, the investment motivation of “market explorer” subsidiaries in China changes 
again to profit expansion.  During this period, the MNS are no longer a drain of the parent’s strategic resources.  On 
the contrary, they rapidly create cash and material flows for the parent company, becoming a global or regional 
strategic business unit of the parent company. 
 
TOWS FRAME ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES 
 
MNCS' overseas subsidiaries, like all firms, choose their growth and development strategies based on their 
perception of the environment and resources they possess. Building on Weirich’s (1982) TOWS technique, and 
following the lead of Oswald, et al, (1997) and Agarwal and Helfat, (2009) we turn our attention to the self – 
reported strategic frame adopted by subsidiaries on entry into China and then compare that frame to that reported at 
present and forecast for the future.  We thereby employ a somewhat expanded version of the TOWS approach to 
combine the resource-based and learning perspectives.  We are able to report the ways this sample of firms has 
adapted to the circumstances they perceive and bring their unique form of competitive advantage into play.  We 
observe that once MNS managers gain awareness and mastery in dealing with the local and global adversities in the 
complex host country conditions, they become more broadly able to accomplish the strategic mission of the MNS, 
namely producing profits.  In order to accomplish this, the subsidiary analyzes the company's environments; coming 
to recognize its advantages and disadvantages, along with the opportunities and threats that exist in observed market 
conditions, and then carefully selects its growth and developing strategy accordingly depending on its strategic 
perspective.  When the overseas subsidiaries appraise the internal capabilities of the company, the comparative 
advantage available via its internal network of resources is brought into play, taking into account the parent’s 
advantage contributions to the abilities of oversea subsidiaries. When the subsidiary analyzes its external 
environment it considers not only the host country's environment, but also changes of the parent country’s 
environment. So the organization-environment analysis of the oversea subsidiaries' strategy is broader than that 
characteristic of companies operating solely domestically because of the complex growth and development 
mechanisms we observe in overseas subsidiaries. The results of our survey questionnaire show that: most 
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subsidiaries in China report themselves to be in the strength-opportunity frame; the proportion amounts to eighty-
two percent of the total.  The subsidiaries reporting themselves in the weakness-threat frame account for the next 
largest proportion.  The percentage in the weakness-threat frame is twelve percent which is much higher than those 
in strength-threat frame (four percent) and weakness-opportunity frame (two percent), as Figure 3 shows below. 
 
  
 
 
 
This figure too, will illustrate that the competitive positions of MNS in China have diverged greatly after an 
initial period of growth and development.  Though most subsidiaries in China are in the better positions than they 
may have originally occupied, a significant minority of firms report themselves in worse conditions characterized by 
weaknesses and threats. 
 
Nearly ninety percent of firms we sampled considered the competitive environment they faced to be 
intense.  Forty-six of the one hundred forty-five respondent subsidiaries' consider competition to be extremely 
intense and eighty-four rate competition as very intense.  So it can be concluded that at present MNS in China all 
feel the competing pressure from Chinese market. On one hand, this kind of competing pressure comes from 
uniqueness of consumer's demands; on the other hand, it comes from the diversification and growing strength of the 
adversaries.  This implies that the nearly half of market entrants hoping to find ripe markets to exploit may have 
underestimated the inherent challenges.  Far from enjoying the benefits usually associated with a ripe growth market 
alone, the respondents have also had to deal with rapidly strengthening and experienced competitors.  Although their 
initial optimism has been attenuated, respondents report the resulting situation has remained profitable to this point. 
 
After the 1990s, the emergence of foreign companies in large numbers and the abrupt rise of domestic 
companies both changed former patterns of competition and corresponding companies’ business practices.  Thus, 
the cycle time to differentiation of MNS in China is shortened by the presence of multiple, intelligent competitors. 
Equally interesting is the fact that responding subsidiaries in China in most industries still think the bulk of 
competitive pressure comes mainly from adversaries with foreign parents in the same or in a related industry, rather 
than from domestic competitors (seventy-nine percent).  This also underscores the fact that although MNS may 
initially possess advantages vis-a-vis host country competitors, any such advantage is short lived.  Many top 
managers of MNS report that host country competitors are sufficiently weak and under-resourced as to make their 
inclusion in industry analyses or external benchmarking unnecessary.  They choose instead to place the emphasis on 
analyzing the actions of the foreign-backed MNS that possess both greater resources and competitive abilities. 
 
Notes: S-O represents the strength-opportunity quadrant; W-T represents the 
weakness-threat quadrant; S-T represents the strength-threat quadrant; W-O 
represents the weakness-opportunity quadrant. 
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Figure  3 TOWS Frames of MNC’s in China 
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As we have observed above, MNS choosing market-developing strategies often enjoy comparative 
advantages against their host country adversaries.  This is particularly true in the fields most impacted by brand 
image and parent company support.  Many market-developing subsidiaries put particular emphasis on the parenting 
advantages accruing as a result of a favorable brand image of parent company that permitted the MNS to develop 
robust market share rapidly during the entry phase.  During the expansion phase in particular emphasis shifted to 
overall competitive advantage through product, market and technology innovation to reinforce the market presence 
further, leading eventually to satisfactory market share and profit. 
 
In contrast, the parent-advantage value of production-base subsidiaries is considerably less related to brand 
image, with the greatest sources of advantage coming from parent company’s financial support and the government 
relations whose support allows the subsidiary to further develop already established relations with local government 
and with providers of raw materials.  This finding is interesting because it indicates that production-base subsidiaries 
often rely on more or less continuous support from the parent company to a very large extent and that the form of 
that reliance tends to remain unchanged over time.  Thus, the market-exploration role is unlikely to develop and 
planned strategic emphasis is more likely to be realized for production based subsidiaries.  It is also true that 
production-base type MNS don't require the influence on the Chinese market potentially available through brand 
image because most often the products they produce sell either back to the parent or sell to other markets, usually 
through the global marketing distribution systems already established by the parent.  The parent companies of 
production-based subsidiaries improve their own competitive ability in global markets through reducing their 
operating costs by the means of tight managerial controls and by making use of the cheaper labor in China. 
 
GENERAL GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
 
We have shown that most MNCS’ subsidiaries in China adopt direct investment to acquire the resources 
they need, such as the low-cost labor force, skilled workers and materials supplied in China market.  But most 
successful firms also quickly recognize that competitive advantage built on local resources is all too often easily 
imitated and cannot last for very long.  We observe that successful firms seek out strategic combinations from which 
the firm can establish a foundation built on overall cost leadership.  Regardless of their roles or on their stage of life 
cycle, the MNS in China always give priority to a strategy of overall cost leadership.  Virtually all the firms in our 
sample attempt to adopt precisely the same strategy!  Irrespective of which factors were chosen as leading to the 
investment initiatives that created the MNS virtually all such firms initially focus on a low-cost labor force and of 
structural configuration to garner favorable tax treatment and relationships with the government to earn preferential 
resource costs and funding.  This demonstrates that initially, MNS pay more attention to cost control than to any 
other competitive factor. 
 
This concentration on overall cost leadership quickly expands from seizing the elemental resources 
required for production to seizing ownership of market share. As firms grow and develop, the subsidiaries gradually 
recognize the importance of acquiring ownership of competitors. Since anti-trust laws are years in the future many 
firms choose to limit local competition in this way.  Merging with the brand of a local company in China is the best 
example.  The main strategy of MNS overseas investment is acquiring the means of monopoly competition and 
using brand and scale advantage.  MNS in China implement this strategy via two related strategic thrusts.  The first 
is to suppress competition from the local firms whose brands are competitive; the second is to supplant the strongest 
local brands with their own.  For illustrative purposes consider Jiahua, a famous brand of shampoo that was acquired 
for $3.14 million and Kongque, a famous brand of television, formerly an SOE that was acquired for a mere $3.15 
million.  Establishing and retaining friendly relationships with the government remains a priority.  MNCS recognize 
that if they want to locate and successfully negotiate for high value-added activities in China, it is necessary to 
observe its laws, build close relationships with government officials, to take care of important constituents and to be 
seen as enthusiastic about public philanthropy. 
 
MNS in China are enthusiastic philanthropists and sponsor many activities and initiatives, which remains 
the dominant means to establish a good public image.  For example, when Proctor and Gamble (USA - P&G) 
donated RMB 500,000 to Project Hope they included this information to the public in their brand advertisements.  
MNS also realize that they can have broad and effective influence on the decision-making process of the 
government and companies by some special "guanxi"(relationship) with them.  For example, Motorola, China’s 
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largest FDI, has donated RMB 24,000,000 to Project Hope, RMB 14,000,000 to university scholarships and thus has 
gained the position of assisting the Chinese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications set industry standards and in 
training many of its staff for the ministry.  By this means, Motorola has managed to make its technical standards the 
de facto industrial standard of Chinese telecommunications.  From its preferential position as a favored partner of 
the government, Motorola can now enjoy preferential treatment at all levels of government units.  This is clear 
indication of the importance of governmental relations in setting up industrial entry barrier against potential rivals. 
We found this uniform similarity in the strategic posture of MNS irrespective of their TOWS quadrant frame. 
 
From the results of the questionnaire, we find that MNS in China, in spite of occupying different strategic 
or frames (S-O, S-T, W-O and W-T), all choose either a developing or a maintaining strategy.  Not a single firm in 
W-T quadrant (presumably the weakest strategic position) chose a retrenchment strategy.  Instead, all chose the 
active maintenance strategy.  We believe this can be attributed to an extremely stable regulatory environment.  The 
developing and maintaining strategy posture manifests three distinguishable characteristics common to all of our 
respondents.  First, parenting advantages are important origins of the competitive advantage for all MNS in China.  
Because of the dependable sustaining resources available from the parent we have already mentioned, such as 
commitment to the market, brand, capital, R&D and advantageous transfer pricing etc., MNS subsidiaries in China 
can afford to choose a developing and maintaining strategy.  We note this characteristic with particular interest since 
many firms reported shock at encountering intense and sustained competition that might have caused firms with 
lesser support and resources to reconsider and perhaps to withdraw or to retrench.  Secondly, we observe 
intensification of strategic integration and systematization of the investment in the MNS by the parent firms.  The 
management parents of the MNS attach significant strategic importance to the successful future of the large scale 
investment inherent in establishing a beachhead through an MNS.  This is particularly true of subsidiaries within the 
parent’s core business processes or products.  Investments in such business domains tend to insist on gaining 
monopoly power in at least a significant region of the country.  Once committed, MNS parents go to extraordinary 
lengths to sustain and extend the advantage they are able to gain.  Once in, there seems to be no looking back.  Often 
this insistence extends to the entire country.  Parent firms enter only after their analysis suggests a region or an 
industry has sufficient potential and upon entering, the MNC enters with sufficient resources for the MNS in terms 
of scale and commitment to make the investment work.  For instance, SONY Japan, investing $410 million, set up 
SONY Shanghai with Shanghai Broadcasting Co. Ltd, which is the largest joint venture of electric industry in 
China.  Some MNS exert extraordinary efforts to achieve monopoly in the target industries.  One of the most famous 
of such examples is the large scale M&A in the rubber industry carried out by the Fukuyama Rubber Co., Ltd. 
(Japan) in 1997 with the Zhongce Corporation.  Today the combined firm, which dominates its several markets, is 
growing at a thirty percent annual rate.  Even in some joint ventures with fewer initial rights to foreign ownership 
options, the parent company effectively strives to gain the de facto operational and management rights to joint 
ventures by the means of controlling technologies, marketing channels abroad and brand.  The final general strategic 
characteristic we observed is the tendency toward as much vertical integration as possible.  This means that in the 
growing and developing process, the subsidiaries take more and more activities in their own value chains, 
attempting to fully integrate R&D, marketing, production, and service.  Local stocks of raw materials and 
production can reduce the production cost in MNS while localizing R&D and service served to improve the 
competence of the MNS in the Chinese market. Localizing HRM functions too can lay the groundwork for 
providing sufficient human resources for further development of subsidiaries in China.  This section has devoted 
itself to the general growth and development strategies characteristic of MNC subsidiaries in China.  Next we report 
our findings of the differences we observed across TOWS frames. 
 
DIFFERENCES AMONG THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES BY TOWS FRAME 
 
Using the TOWS approach (Weirich, 1982) we classified the strategic posture of MNS subsidiaries in 
China into four discrete frames (or quadrants).  Based on our TOWS analysis we were able to expose differences 
among MNC subsidiaries’ self-classification and to capture their strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990) over 
time.  We classified the subsidiaries in W-T, S-T, S-O and W-O frames as suggested by Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4 
 
 The WT Strategy (mini-mini).  In general, the aim of the WT strategy is to minimize both weaknesses and 
threats. A company faced with external threats and internal weaknesses may indeed be in a precarious 
position. 
 The WO Strategy (mini--maxi).  The second strategy attempts to minimize the weaknesses and to 
maximize tile opportunities.  A company may identify opportunities in the external environment but have 
organizational weaknesses which prevent the firm from taking advantage of market demands. 
 The ST Strategy (maxi-mini).  This strategy is based on the strengths of the organization that can deal with 
threats in the environment.  The aim is to maximize the former while minimizing the latter. 
 The SO Strategy (maxi-maxi).  Any company would like to be in a position where it can maximize both, 
strengths and opportunities. Such an enterprise can lead from strengths, utilizing resources to take 
advantage of the market for its products and services. (Weihrich, 1982, pg. 59) 
 
Figure 5 below lists the initial frame proportions of the MNC subsidiaries in our sample.  The following 
exhibits (Tables 3 – 6) share a common format that permits us to describe the ranked strategic priorities of the 
subsidiaries we studied in more detail and over time.  The rows in the tables list the strategic priorities reported by 
the firm at various points in time.  Those priorities are listed (a – n) in the accompanying notes to each table.  
Respondents were asked to list their firm’s strategic priorities for three points in time.  The first was “On Entry”.  
This classification generally refers to the time at which the MNC was founded and began operations in China.  In 
some cases, this point might reflect the entry of a new firm into the country.  In others, the point might reflect the 
conversion of an SOE to a joint venture or to the establishment of an MNC subsidiary in some other form.  In all 
cases, what is captured is the initial strategic intent of the MNC subsidiary as understood by the respondent.  The 
second point in time reflected by our results is “At Present” which generally reflects the set of current strategic 
priorities.  Finally, “In the Future” reports the set of anticipated priorities expected by the respondent at some time in 
the future.  This category is dependent on anticipated performance and the influence of exogenous variables and can 
be viewed as the least reliable of our reported results.  The rows in each table also list the proportion of respondents 
assigning a given ranking to a strategic priority.  Thus, for example, in Table 3 seventy-five point five percent of 
respondents listed “lowering overall cost” (b) as their top priority on market entry, fifty-eight point four percent list 
that priority as being foremost at the present time and sixty-seven point six percent expect that priority to be 
foremost at some future point in time.  This finding is consistent with Hamel and Prahalad’s assertion that the 
dominant strategic intent of successful global firms can be expected to be stable over time (1990, pg. 40).  A final 
characteristic of note relating to the exhibits is that blank cells in a table should not be seen as indicating missing 
data.  Instead blank cells in the following exhibits reflect that fewer strategic priorities were reported for that period 
among our sample than were required in others.  In some cases (note the W – O frame at-present report in Table 4 
below) as few a six strategic priorities were sufficient to capture the strategic intent for the entire sample.  The 
maximum number of strategic priorities required to report our results was fourteen. 
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From the collected reports we first report strategies adopted and being adopted by the MNS in the S-O 
frame, as listed by respondents in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Evolution of Subsidiaries in the S – O Quadrant 
 On Entry At Present In the Future 
Strategy 
Proportion 
(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
NO. 1 b 75.5 b 58.4 b 67.6 
NO. 2 k 63.8 i 53.9 j 65.7 
NO. 3 i 60.6 j 46.0 i 65.5 
NO. 4 h 56.4 h 43.4 k 65.5 
NO. 5 j 46.8 k 42.5 h 64.9 
NO. 6 d 42.6 g 36.3 g 63.1 
NO. 7 g 39.4 d 30.9 a 58.1 
NO. 8 f 38.3 f 30.9 f 56.9 
NO. 9 a 31.9 l 24.8 l 55.7 
NO. 10 l 26.6 a 20.4 d 52.7 
NO. 11 c 12.8 m 12.4 m 49.2 
NO. 12 m 8.5 c 8.8 c 39.4 
NO. 13 c 5.3 e 7.9 e 38.4 
NO. 14 n 1.06   n 32.1 
Notes: a – n designate the strategy adopted or intended by the MNC’s Subsidiaries in China.  In order they are:  (a) Expanding 
the scale of the business, (b) lowering overall cost, (c) M & A, (d) focus strategy, (e) strategic alliance, (f) differentiation, (g) 
largest market share, (h) product innovation, (i) marketing innovation, (j) technical innovation, (k) setting up good company’s 
image, (l) developing internally, (m) maintaining the existing situation, (n) retreating in order to advance 
 
Note the dominant priority of overall cost reduction is consistently reported as the top priority of a majority 
of respondents, past present and future.  This is consistent with our prior expectations since dominant competitors 
often employ such strategies and as we reported above, acquiring a market dominant position often occupies the 
attention, time and effort of management when resources permit.  Next, notice that in the strength - opportunities 
frame the strategies of focus and differentiation are similarly prioritized.  Whether reporting on strategic priorities 
employed in the past or being employed at present, the subsidiaries of in this frame assign the higher priority to a 
focus strategy.  Thus, we observe that while firms attempt to reduce costs, they also place emphasis on product 
innovation, marketing innovation, technical innovation, and image than on the adoption of either alternative 
strategy.  In fact, the approach adopted by the firms in our sample is contrary to the strategy of differentiation which 
relies on the ability to offer products and services that differ significantly from others offered in the market.  
Because the adoption of a strategy of differentiation causes costs to inevitably increase, multinational corporations 
in this frame do not attempt to employ this strategy at first.  Rather, the firms concentrate on cost reductions to be 
employed immediately and on product and marketing innovations for later deployment.  As markets mature, quality 
products become the norm for consumers and the nature of demand diverges.  Of course, competing based solely on 
cost advantage becomes less desirable as margins narrow.  As it becomes more difficult for the MNS to rely on 
overall cost leadership and focus strategies alone the firms gradually appeal to consumers through a strategy of 
differentiation to further establish and consolidate their competitive advantage. 
 
We also note that strength-opportunity frame MNS pay considerable attention to setting up good business 
reputations, through which they can obtain broad-based awareness of their business practices and support from 
officials at all levels of the government, as well as promoting a positive business identity to the public.  These 
multinational corporations exhibit awareness of the importance of having established good business image with the 
government to plans to expand to new markets and to increase market share.  Given that the MNS are experiencing 
more intense competition than they anticipated, the tendencies of strength-opportunity frame subsidiaries to adopt 
the strategies of technique innovation, market innovation and product innovation early is consistent with good 
business practices.  As far as the strength opportunity type MNS are concerned, the relationship among the above 
three kinds of innovation is just indicated in Figure 3. 
 
Rank 
Stage 
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Figure 3 Innovation Strategies Adopted by the Strength-Opportunity Subsidiaries in China 
 
What is interesting too is that the importance of expanding business scale descends from thirty-one point 
nine percent to twenty point four percent from the market entry to the present.  Although strength-opportunity frame 
subsidiaries in China evaluate the importance of expanding business scale highly, the strategy is now gradually 
replaced by internal growth strategies.  The strength-opportunity frame MNS are inclined to emphasize internal 
development over other forms.  And, although only a handful of subsidiaries have chosen to grow and develop by 
the method of establishing business alliances or M&A (merger and acquisition) thus far, a higher proportion report 
having such activities in mind for the future.  In fact, in the past, strategic alliances were not a part of the strategic 
priorities reported by the firms we studied.  Note that setting up new business alliances has become a priority and 
that the proportion will rise in the future.  M&A initiatives have decreased both in rank and proportion since market 
entry for the reporting firms (from rank 11 to rank 12 and from 12.8% to 8.8%).  We conclude that the strength-
opportunity frame MNS in China present a strategic posture of' being the most numerous and active of the firms we 
sampled, concentrating on the strategy combination that consists of an overall cost leadership as the dominant 
strategy and strategies for innovation as assisting strategies.  We have been able to observe the shifting priorities of 
the MNS on the S-O frame since market entry and to expose the underlying logic of the innovation strategies 
reported.  Overall, the strategies adopted by the strength-opportunity type MNS in China can be characterized as 
beginning with overall cost strategies and gradually giving way to focus and differentiation strategies in that order.  
Next, we turn our attention to the second most populous TOWS frame, the W –T quadrant.  From the collected data, 
we can see the strategies adopted and being adopted the by subsidiaries in W-T quadrant, demonstrated in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Evolution of Subsidiaries in the W – T Quadrant 
 On Entry At Present In the Future 
 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
84.6(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion Percentage 
(%) 
NO. 1 b 69.2 b 84.6 b 87.7 
NO. 2 i 61.5 h 46.2 i 76.9 
NO. 3 d 38.5 j 46.2 h 72.3 
NO. 4 j 38.5 f 30.8 j 70.8 
NO. 5 k 38.5 i 30.8 g 67.7 
NO. 6 l 38.5 m 30.8 k 67.7 
NO. 7 a 30.8 a 23.1 a 64.6 
NO. 8 f 30.8 g 23.1 d 60 
NO. 9 h 30.8 k 23.1 f 58.5 
NO. 10 m 30.8 d 15.4 l 55.4 
NO. 11 g 23.1 l 15.4 m 55.4 
NO. 12 e 15.4 c 7.69 e 38.5 
NO. 13 c 7.69 e 7.69 c 33.8 
NO. 14 n 7.69   n 30.8 
Notes: a – n designate the strategy adopted or intended by the MNC’s Subsidiaries in China.  In order they are:  (a) Expanding 
the scale of the business, (b) lowering overall cost, (c) M & A, (d) focus strategy, (e) strategic alliance, (f) differentiation, (g) 
largest market share, (h) product innovation, (i) marketing innovation, (j) technical innovation, (k) setting up good company’s 
image, (l) developing internally, (m) maintaining the existing situation, (n) retreating in order to advance.  
 
 
 
Rank 
Stage 
The adoption proportion becomes higher and the 
Priority of the initiative becomes stronger over time 
Product innovation Market innovation Technique innovation 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2013 Volume 29, Number 5 
2013 The Clute Institute  Copyright by author(s) Creative Commons License CC-BY 1275 
The weakness-threat frame subsidiaries in China occupy second highest (twelve percent) frame we have 
examined.  We note with interest that these firms report market entry strategies that included both focus and 
differentiation in addition to overall cost leadership.  Perhaps the apparent lack of unambiguous focus has resulted in 
the weak competitive position reported by our respondents.  A competitive position self-reported as relatively weak 
combined with a high level of perceived competitive pressure has caused the weakness-threat frame MNS in China 
to abandon the strategy of focus and differentiation in favor resort to the strategy of overall cost leadership (we note 
that the strategies decline from rank 3 to 8 and from rank 8 to rank 9 respectively).  The next highest priorities of the 
weakness-threat frame MNS in China emphasize market innovation, product innovation and technique innovation 
despite of their competitively disadvantageous position.  We also note with interest and surprise that the weakness-
threat frame subsidiaries in China give greater weight (higher rankings) to product innovation strategies than do 
weakness-opportunity frame MNS in China when the reverse would seem to be more likely the case.  Our measures 
of product innovation were divided into imitative innovations and first-time innovations.  The weakness-threat type 
subsidiaries in China lay more emphasis on the former method than the latter to exploit the market. A significant 
proportion of the reporting MNS in China (30.8 %) realize that such innovation is required merely to maintain the 
current competition position.  In addition, at market entry the weakness-threat type subsidiaries in China (fifteen 
point four percent 15.4%) chose to establish business alliance to obtain resources, but now only half that proportion 
still report aspiring to this strategy.  Worthy of note too, is that the weakness-threat frame MNS are to a very high 
degree dependent on themselves alone for resources that might be available by establishing business alliances or 
through M&A.  Their attitude toward the acquiring strategic resources is both clear and consistent. 
 
Taken as a group then, the weakness-threat frame subsidiaries present a strategic posture we characterize as 
one of active maintenance, consisting of strategies in which innovation is predominant, with strategies of corporate 
identity and diversification as assisting strategies.  From this description of the W – T frame we turn our attention 
next to the S – T frame. 
 
Those strategies adopted and being adopted the by subsidiaries in S-T quadrant, are demonstrated in Table 
5.  The first distinguishable finding of interest is that the subsidiaries in the S-T frame collectively choose very 
stable strategy combinations.  Whether we consider the past (market entry) strategy or the present strategy being 
employed, these subsidiaries always regard the strategy of overall-cost leadership to be their first choice and the 
differentiation strategy as their last.  We observed that this set of firms actively sought to use their strengths in 
production to accommodate diversification while increasing capacity utilization and increasing market share. 
 
Table 5 Evolution of Subsidiaries in the S – T Quadrant 
 On Entry At Present In the Future 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
84.6(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
NO. 1 b 100 b 100 b 87.7 
NO. 2 g 75 g 75 i 76.9 
NO. 3 a 50 i 75 k 72.3 
NO. 4 d 50 a 50 g 70.8 
NO. 5 f 50 h 50 j 67.7 
NO. 6 i 50 k 50 h 67.7 
NO. 7 j 50 m 50 a 64.6 
NO. 8 k 50 d 25 m 60 
NO. 9 m 50 e 25 d 58.5 
NO. 10 c 25 f 25 f 55.4 
NO. 11 h 25 j 25 l 55.4 
NO. 12     c 40 
NO. 13     e 40 
NO. 14     n 35 
Notes: a – n designate the strategy adopted or intended by the MNC’s Subsidiaries in China.  In order they are:  (a) Expanding 
the scale of the business, (b) lowering overall cost, (c) M & A, (d) focus strategy, (e) strategic alliance, (f) differentiation, (g) 
largest market share, (h) product innovation, (i) marketing innovation, (j) technical innovation, (k) setting up good company’s 
image, (l) developing internally, (m) maintaining the existing situation, (n) retreating in order to advance.  
 
Rank 
Stage 
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The priority assigned to gaining market share was unique to the S – T frame group. Compared with other 
subsidiaries with weak opportunities, these subsidiaries prefer to actively explore the market and to build share 
through diversification strategies.  Furthermore, most subsidiaries chose concentric diversification, namely growing 
and developing in the same or in a related industry.  By this means, subsidiaries in the S-T quadrant not only 
enhance their core competitive advantage (efficient production), but also spread and diffuse operational risks and 
exploit the market effectively.  Despite of the threats they perceive from the external environment, these subsidiaries 
steadfastly regard the maximization of their market share as the predominant goal.  Consequently, they gradually 
adjust the core of their strategies to the strategy of innovation represented by market innovation based on keeping 
pace with active programs of diversification. From the perspective of the recognition of the importance of the 
strategies, the subsidiaries in the S-T quadrant pay more and more attention than others to the strategies of M&A 
and establishing strategic alliances.  Therefore, these subsidiaries try to realize their growth and developing 
strategies through diversification to obtain the required strategic resources (access to distribution networks, host 
country brands, and raw materials). 
 
Generally speaking, it can be said that the subsidiaries in the S-T frame have adopted strategies dominated 
by diversification to a greater extent than those in the S – T and W – T frames.  At the same time the importance of 
the strategies of innovation and corporate identity has been increasing incrementally.  As alliances and brands 
mature this can be expected to continue.  We next turn our attention to our least populous TOWS frame, the W - O 
quadrant. 
 
Table 6 reports the strategies adopted and being adopted by subsidiaries in W-O quadrant.  At the point of 
market entry the first order of priority for this group of firms is no different from the others we have discussed.  
However, we see that market innovation has displaced overall-cost leadership at present, albeit temporarily.  What 
can be seen, however, is that the weakness-opportunity frame subsidiaries in China seem to uniformly prefer the 
focus strategy to that of differentiation.  The fundamental reason we infer is that their disadvantageous competitive 
situation makes them resist the pressure to effectively incur the increased costs associated with a strategy of 
differentiation enacted on a broad scale. Secondly, the occupants of the weakness-opportunity frame in China attach 
greater importance to the strategies of innovation and corporate identity from the beginning than do others.  In 
addition, they completely depend exclusively on their internal development without adopting the strategy of M&A 
and or establishing business alliances. 
 
Table 6 Evolution of Subsidiaries in the W – O Quadrant 
 On Entry At Present In the Future 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
Strategy 
Proportion 
Percentage 
(%) 
NO. 1 b 100 i 100 b 100 
NO. 2 d 100 b 100 j 100 
NO. 3 j 100 d 50 i 90 
NO. 4 g 50 f 50 a 80 
NO. 5 h 50 h 50 d 80 
NO. 6 i 50 k 50 g 80 
NO. 7 k 50   f 70 
NO. 8 m 50   h 70 
NO. 9 n 50   k 70 
NO. 10     e 60 
NO. 11     l 50 
NO. 12     m 50 
Notes: a – n designate the strategy adopted or intended by the MNC’s Subsidiaries in China.  In order they are:  (a) Expanding 
the scale of the business, (b) lowering overall cost, (c) M & A, (d) focus strategy, (e) strategic alliance, (f) differentiation, (g) 
largest market share, (h) product innovation, (i) marketing innovation, (j) technical innovation, (k) setting up good company’s 
image, (l) developing internally, (m) maintaining the existing situation, (n) retreating in order to advance. 
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Unlike the strength-opportunity frame subsidiaries in China, the weakness-opportunity type subsidiaries in 
China present a strategic posture that reflects a greater degree of variability.  We note the priority assigned to 
“setting up good company’s image” is lower than that assigned to it by those in the S – O frame.  Concretely, this 
indicates either a lack of awareness of a strategic factor seen by other groups as critical or an absence of the 
opportunities and resources required to pursue the priority.  The evidence suggests the former is more likely the 
case, based on the prospective ranking of the factor (rank 9).  While attempting to maintain their current competition 
position, the weakness-opportunity frame subsidiaries in China adopt strategies combining a focus on corporate 
identity and innovation, and seek new growth opportunities and resources from their parents.  Thus, the weakness-
opportunity frame subsidiaries in China present a strategic posture that can be described as less stable than others 
and focusing more internally than externally. 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This has been a study of the evolution of strategies among large multinational firms doing business in 
China.  We report the motivations, actions and aspirations of the managers of largest multinational subsidiaries 
operating in China. The first part of our research related to the ownership and industry characteristics respondents, 
nearly one-third were at the CEO or board level.  Twenty-two industries were represented.  We found that the 
dominant strategy employed by multinational corporations in establishing MNC subsidiaries (MNS) in China is 
overall cost leadership.  Our research suggests that the role of the MNS does not always remain fixed over time.  
Adjustments to MNS role in our sample, though infrequent, have shifted roles from production-based to more 
market based roles.  We have also found that the primary investment motivation of MNS in China has changed from 
“low labor cost” to “exploiting Chinese market”.  We tracked and described the ways in which “market explorer” 
MNS behave from market entry through the growth and expansion phases of development. We observed that during 
the expansion phase in particular MNS emphasis shifted to overall competitive advantage through product, market 
and technology innovations developed to reinforce its market presence.  We observe that once MNS managers gain 
awareness and mastery in dealing with the local and global adversities in the complex host country conditions, they 
become more broadly able to accomplish the strategic mission of the MNS.  Nearly ninety percent of firms we 
sampled considered the competitive environment they faced to be intense.  Using the TOWS approach (Weirich, 
1982) we classified the strategic posture of MNS subsidiaries in China into four discrete frames (or quadrants).  We 
found that MNS in China, in spite of occupying different strategic or frames (S-O, S-T, W-O and W-T), all chose 
either a developing or a maintaining strategy.  The TOWS frame of analysis provides a base that is helpful to 
analyze and comprehend the strategic similarities and difference among MNS.  The results from our study applying 
the TOWS approach have allowed us to expose the trend of strategic evolution. 
 
The research results show that there is significant variation in the strategic posture exhibited by MNS.  This 
difference is shown in each of the four frames.  In the S-O quadrant MNS in China adopt a consistent developing 
strategy based on overall cost leadership.  Overall, the strategies adopted by the strength-opportunity frame MNS in 
China can be characterized as beginning with overall cost strategies and gradually giving way to focus and 
differentiation strategies in that order.  In the W- O frame MNS in China seek active development on the basis of 
maintenance, concentrating on product-innovation centered innovating strategy.  Further, weakness-opportunity 
frame MNS seem to uniformly prefer the focus strategy to that of differentiation.  Furthermore, the occupants of the 
weakness-opportunity frame in China attach greater importance to the strategies of innovation and corporate identity 
from the beginning than do others.  In addition, they depend exclusively on internal development without adopting 
the strategy of M&A and or establishing business alliances.  Taken as a group the weakness-threat W – T frame 
MNS present a strategic posture we characterize as one of active maintenance, consisting of strategies in which 
innovation is predominant, with strategies of corporate identity and diversification as assisting strategies.  Generally 
speaking, it can be said that the subsidiaries in the S-T frame have adopted strategies dominated by diversification to 
a greater extent than those in the S – T and W – T frames.  At the same time the importance of the strategies of 
innovation and corporate identity increase incrementally.  As alliances and brands mature this can be expected to 
continue. 
 
Our results are limited due to the imperfections and limitations in our sample.  The fact that only thirty 
percent of respondents were strategic managers calls into question whether the homogeneity of the sample can be 
relied upon to accurately reflect the actual strategic intent of the firms whose strategies and aspirations we sought to 
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capture and report.  Resource limitations prevented us from expanding the sample to a larger group.  We are 
consoled by the fact that the largest firms were represented and that top managers’ observations were included.  We 
have limited our findings to descriptions that we believe will aid the reader in better understanding the evolution of 
strategies in a descriptive sense.  A second limitation that should be acknowledged relates to language.  We 
surveyed managers using instruments in Mandarin and English.  This limitation was imposed by the nationalities of 
the authors and by our desire to maintain control over the survey.  We have noted above that more than half our 
sample respondents were from either South Korea or from the European Union.  Thus, despite our best efforts we 
know that some information has certainly been lost in translation.  The small numbers available to us for 
examination in the less well-populated frames of the TOWS analysis beg the question of generalizability beyond our 
sample.  Surely, we would have preferred it otherwise.  Future researchers taking up this topic would be well 
advised to improve on the methodology we have employed. 
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